Leavenworth Strategist

French Conservative: "Union of the West" will Sustain Western Dominance

Posted by Kyle Atwell in Transatlantic Relations on Tuesday, January 8. 2008 Édouard Balladur, the right-wing former French Prime Minister (1993-1995), envisions the creation of a "Union of the West" that will help the US and Europe maintain global primacy. The International Herald Tribune summarizes Balladur's argument: Europe and the United States acting in concert can best deal with China and Russia's advance, and the instability brought by radical Islam. Reality insists that alone, the Americans and Europeans have growing disadvantages in a world where the rule of law and democracy are not serving as controls over newly distributed economic and political power.

Bin Laden Tape Aimed at Europe

By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, November 30, 2007; A20

Osama bin Laden stepped up his recent public-relations offensive yesterday with the release of a new audiotape, in which the al-Qaeda leader called on Europeans to break with the United States by ending their military involvement in Afghanistan.

Back to the Brink In the Balkans

Washington Post
By Richard Holbrooke
Sunday, November 25, 2007; B07

At a most inopportune time, the Balkans are back. On Dec. 10, the U.S.-E.U.-Russian negotiating team tasked with getting the Serbs and Albanians to agree on Kosovo's future status will report to the United Nations that it has failed. A few weeks later Kosovo's government will proclaim that Kosovo is an independent nation -- a long overdue event.

The United States and most of the European Union (led by Britain, France and Germany) will recognize Kosovo quickly. Russia and its allies will not. Kosovo's eight-year run as the biggest-ever U.N. project will end with great tension and a threat of violence that could spread to Bosnia.

Our (U.S.) Bases in Europe

Max Boot - 11.21.2007 - 09:32
To his credit, Bob Gates continues to unravel some of the misguided decisions made by his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. His latest decision, as noted in this article, is to stop the drawdown of U.S. troops in Europe.

Rumsfeld was determined to close down or downsize major U.S. bases on the continent that had been in existence for decades, principally in Italy and Germany. He had already reduced the U.S. troop presence to 43,000 from 62,000 two years ago, and he planned further cuts down to 24,000 by the end of next year. Gates has now stopped the exodus, and pledges to maintain U.S. troops at their current level in Europe. This comes on top of his welcome decisions to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps and to increase the number of U.S. troops in Iraq—both decisions that Rumsfeld should have made years ago.

The impetus for Rumsfeld’s base realignment plan was seemingly logical—the cold war was over and U.S. troops were no longer needed to defend Germany from the Red Army. But in practice what Rumsfeld envisioned didn’t make so much sense—moving most of the troops back to the U.S., and then having small numbers of them rotate for brief periods through new “lily pad” bases established in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and elsewhere, which lacked longterm housing for our forces.

The idea of creating new bases on the new frontiers of freedom makes sense. But moving the bulk of the U.S. troops to permanent bases in “CONUS” (the continental United States) made less sense. The transition would have been a costly one, with new quarters having to be built for the troops and the government having to pick up vast moving costs.

Other costs would have been geopolitical rather than financial: the shift called into question the U.S. commitment to Europe. It also put U.S. forces farther away from future trouble spots in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. (Germany, for all its disagreements with U.S. policy decisions, has never hindered the efficient movement by rail, sea, and air of U.S. troops from its soil to battlefields in the Middle East.)

Finally, there is a cultural cost involved: generations of American soldiers and their families generally have enjoyed living for a few years in Europe, and this has fostered closer trans-Atlantic cultural links. It is hard to see why it is good either for Europeans or Americans to have more troops consolidated on giant, dusty bases in the middle of Texas or other uncongenial spots back home.

Are Americans More Willing to Make Sacrifices Than Europeans?

Posted by Joerg Wolf in Transatlantic Relations on Wednesday, November 21. 2007

According to Henry Kissinger, the real transatlantic difference is that "European governments are not able any more to ask their people for great sacrifices." That's why Europe readily opts for a "soft power" approach to so many foreign policy issues. This will, of necessity, make it harder for Europe to reach a consensus with the U.S.

Asked whether "an all-out effort to restore the Cold War-era level of trans-Atlantic comity within NATO, would be a good investment for the U.S.", Mr. Kissinger expressed skepticism regarding the prospects for success. Kissinger's views on diplomacy in the post 9/11 era are described in a Wall Street Journal article (HT: Joe) by David Rivkin, a lawyer based in Washington, who served in the Justice Department under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

Are the differences between Americans and Europeans regarding sacrifice really that big? Germany is certainly a post-heroic society. The Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences has even a research procejt on "Armed forces in a post-heroic society." Though, isn't America quickly moving towards a post-heroic society as well? Compared to WWII or Vietnam the casualties in Iraq are pretty small, but the calls for withdrawal are already very loud.

Kissinger does not discuss whether America is a post-heroic society. Of course, only the Europeans are softies. Then why are less and less Americans willing to support sacrifices in Iraq? Because politicians are guided increasingly by short-term political calculations, writes Rivkin about Kissinger's views. He adds:

The American Republic was not originally designed to sustain an ability to pursue a complex foreign policy. The Framers tended to assume that, once independent, the U.S. could operate reasonably well in relative isolation. These attitudes persist. As a result, Mr. Kissinger posits, Americans have little patience "for a long time of foreign tension."
Because of this, "presidents tend to present difficult cases, particularly those involving military engagements, to the American people in terms of a finite timeline. As a result, they often end up implying, or promising, achievements that may not be possible in the short term--and that are by no means guaranteed over the long term."

So, it seems Americans do not support sacrifices either, because they have little patience for a long time of foreign tension. Sacrifice requires patience. Expecting instant democratisation in Iraq is not sacrifice.

To conclude: I don't see that much of a difference between Americans and Europeans in this regard. US politicians talk more about heroism and sacrifice than their European counterparts. Kissinger is quite right: "European governments are not able any more to ask their people for great sacrifices." But: The US government is not able to ask its people for great sacrifices for more than five years either and every major challenge takes more than five years. What's the use of being able to ask for sacrifices to get into a war, but not being able to ask for the sacrifices to bring the mission to a successful end?

The current Foreign Policy cover story The War We Deserve (subscribers only) makes a similar point: 
It's easy to blame the violence in Iraq and the pitfalls of the war on terror on a small cabal of neocons, a bumbling president, and an overstretched military. But real fault lies with the American people as well. Americans now ask more of their government but sacrifice less than ever before. It's an unrealistic, even deadly, way to fight a global war. And, unfortunately, that's just how the American people want it.
Perhaps the biggest transatlantic difference is optimism: Most Americans have this famous can-do spirit, which is a very sympathetic personal characteristic, but in politics it leads to trouble. US voters can be tricked into supporting a war, as Kissinger seems to admit.

American politicians have much more faith in military solutions than their European counterparts: Many Americans think that Iran's nuclear program must be stopped by military means, if necessary. This means that they assume that it can be stopped by military means. Europeans are much more pessimistic and strongly doubt whether Iran's nuclear program could be brought to an end by military means.

Now, I know, Kissinger and many others make the same argument in opposite terms: Europeans want soft power, because they cannot do hard power. While there is some truth to that (or perhaps even a lot), I still believe that the main reason is the different lesson from history: Europeans have a long collective memory of war. For many of us "war" means defeat and tens of millions of dead civilians in our countries and total destruction of our cities. We had enough of that. That's why pacifist sentiments are so strong. It's a feeling. It's not reason. That's why post-heroic society. That's why pessimism towards military solutions.

For Americans, "war" is something that takes place in distant lands. Even during the current Iraq war, Americans go on shopping sprees as usual. This was different during Europe's wars in the last 300 years.

Of course, European pessimism and lack of self-esteem is likely to lead to inaction and could result in huge crises as well. My point is not that the American attitude is bad and the European is good. I just want to describe the transatlantic differences as I see them. Best would be some attitude in between.

The transatlantic similarities are bigger than the transatlantic difference, I believe: The US is moving towards a post-heroic society as well -- or perhaps already is one.